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9 **UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT**  
 10 **FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEVADA**

11 In re: 12 FRONT SIGHT MANAGEMENT LLC, 13 Debtor.	Case No.: 22-11824-ABL Chapter 11 Date: November 18, 2022 Time: 9:30 a.m.
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15 **JOINDER TO DEBTOR’S MOTION FOR CONFIRMATION OF DEBTOR’S SECOND**  
 16 **AMENDED CHAPTER 11 PLAN OF REORGANIZATION AND OMNIBUS RESPONSE**  
 17 **TO OBJECTIONS THERETO**

18 Dr. Ignatius Piazza, Jennifer Piazza, VNV Dynasty Trust I, and VNV Dynasty Trust II  
 19 (collectively, the “Piazzas”), by and through their counsel, the law firm of Garman Turner Gordon  
 20 LLP, hereby file this joinder to the *Debtor’s Motion for Confirmation of Debtor’s Second Amended*  
 21 *Chapter 11 Plan of Reorganization* [ECF No. 439] (the “Motion”) filed by Front Sight Management,  
 22 LLC (“Debtor”) and omnibus response to (1) the *Opposition to Debtor’s Motion for Confirmation of*  
 23 *Debtor’s Second Amended Chapter 11 Plan of Reorganization* [ECF No. 484] (the “Meacher  
 24 Objection”) filed by Michael Meacher, dba Bankgroup Financial Services (“Meacher”) and the  
 25 *Objection of the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors to Confirmation of Debtor’s Second*  
 26 *Amended Chapter 11 Plan of Reorganization* [ECF No. 495] (the “Committee Objection,” and

1 together with the Meacher Objection, the “Objections”) by the Official Committee of Unsecured  
2 Creditors.<sup>1</sup>

3 This joinder and response (the “Response”) is made and based on the points and authorities  
4 provided herein, as well as the papers and pleadings filed on the docket in the Debtor’s chapter 11  
5 case, judicial notice of which is respectfully requested pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 201, and  
6 such other and further evidence as may be provided in advance of and at the hearing on plan  
7 confirmation.

### 8 I. INTRODUCTION

9 Dr. Piazza’s intent and desire has always been to build a full service vacation destination  
10 providing for first class firearm training and related operations. That intent and desire was thwarted  
11 when, after the Debtor secured \$75 million in promised funding to build the development, Las Vegas  
12 Development Fund, LLC (“LVDF”) defaulted on its obligations by ultimately only raising and  
13 funding \$6,375,000, less than 10% of the amount promised. LVDF’s actions, or more appropriately,  
14 its failures, caused Debtor’s financial hardship and led to the filing of this Chapter 11 Case.  
15 Nonetheless, in order to avoid a sale under the DIP Order,<sup>2</sup> and to secure the best outcome for Debtor’s  
16 creditors and members (which is a material improvement over the outcome contemplated by the FS  
17 DIP stalking horse agreement), Debtor negotiated a plan that maintains a future gun range for  
18 members and creates a \$3,000,000 pool for the benefit unsecured creditors (which would have been  
19 \$3,500,000 if an additional \$500,000 was not needed for professional fees because counsel to the  
20 UCC exceeded their budgeted amounts). The continuation of the gun range for the benefit of current  
21 members and this pool of funds would otherwise not be available under the terms of the FS DIP  
22 stalking horse agreement.

23 As part of this improved Plan and the treatment thereunder, Nevada PF, LLC (“Nevada PF”)  
24 has required a broad 10-year consulting agreement and nationwide non-compete agreement from Dr.  
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26 <sup>1</sup> This Reply is not intended to address all of the arguments raised in the Objections, but seeks to offer clarification on  
27 the incorrect allegations and assertions regarding Dr. Piazza. In doing so, Dr. Piazza does not concede that any other  
arguments have merit as Dr. Piazza understands those will be addressed by Debtor.

28 <sup>2</sup> ECF No. 228

1 Piazza personally, in addition to a requirement that he provide marketing and other services for the  
 2 same 10-year period. All of these terms are a condition to Nevada PF's willingness to support the  
 3 plan and improve the terms provided to them under the FS DIP stalking horse agreement. There is no  
 4 violation of the absolute priority rule as there is not a retention of any property on behalf of the  
 5 Piazzas' prior equity interest, and they are not improper third-party releases under the Plan.

6 Ignoring this reality, and in a thinly veiled attempt to gain leverage where it has none, the  
 7 Committee Objection turns its focus to unleashing a barrage of allegations against Dr. Piazza  
 8 insinuating that he has done nothing over the last ten years other than take money from Debtor. The  
 9 Committee Objection misleadingly tells only half of the story because it intentionally ignores the  
 10 other critical information that has been in the Committee's possession such the beginning of this case:  
 11 Dr. Piazza has consistently provided funds to Debtor to continue operations and, in fact, in at least the  
 12 past four years alone, infused more than \$2,000,000 than was disbursed in his attempts to protect the  
 13 creditors and their membership fees in spite of LVDF's harm. Moreover, while incorrectly arguing  
 14 for a ten year look back period, even if correct (it is not), the Committee Objection fails entirely to  
 15 consider any of the other elements that would have to be proven in order for any party to prevail on a  
 16 fraudulent transfer claim against the Piazzas. Ultimately, there are no viable claims for fraudulent  
 17 transfer against the Piazzas, leading to the only conclusion that the best interest test is satisfied because  
 18 creditors will receive more under the current proposed plan than they would in a chapter 7.

## 19 II. LEGAL ARGUMENT AND ANALYSIS

### 20 A. The Plan Does Not Violate the Absolute Priority Rule.

21 The Objections both argue that the plan violates the absolute priority rule by contending  
 22 that Dr. Piazza is retaining property on account of his equity interest in the Debtor. *See Meacher*  
 23 *Objection*, p. 7, l. 21 – p. 10, l. 18; *see Committee Objection*, p. 15, l. 16 – p. 16, l. 12. He is not.

24 Section 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii) provides that, with respect to a class of unsecured claims:<sup>3</sup>

25 (ii) the holder of any claim or interest that is junior to the claims of such class will  
 26 not receive or retain under the plan *on account of such junior claim or interest*  
*any property*, except that in a case in which the debtor is an individual, the debtor

27 <sup>3</sup> As an initial matter, a reserve has been set aside for Meacher's secured claim, so it is unclear how he contends he  
 28 has standing to even raise this argument, and the unsecured creditor class has accepted the Plan.

1 may retain property included in the estate under section 1115, subject to the  
2 requirements of subsection (a)(14) of this section.

3 11 U.S.C. § 1129(B)(2)(b)(ii)(emphasis added).

4 Dr. Piazza is not receiving anything through the Plan on account of his equity interest.  
5 Instead, Nevada PF negotiated for a consulting agreement, which also contains a highly valuable  
6 non-compete and future services requirement, pursuant to which Dr. Piazza, among other things,  
7 assists with marketing and prosecuting objections to claims and certain causes of action. As Dr.  
8 Piazza has been successful and experienced for more than two decades, this was a critical  
9 component to Nevada PF. In exchange, Dr. Piazza is agreeing to forego his ability to otherwise  
10 earn a living in this space which, based on Dr. Piazza’s prior success and likely continued success  
11 had LVDF not defaulted on its contractual promises, is significant.

12 This case is not like *In re DBSD North America, Inc.*, 634 F.3d 79 (2d Cir. 2011), on which  
13 Meacher relies. *See* Meacher Objection, pp. 8-9. In that case, as part of the plan, the plan proponent  
14 purported to “gift” equity holders shares and warrants in the reorganized debtor. *Id.* at 95.  
15 Specifically, the plan expressly provided :

16 .... In full and final satisfaction, settlement, release, and discharge of each Existing  
17 Stockholder Interest, and on account of all valuable consideration provided by the  
18 Existing Stockholder, including, without limitation, certain consideration provided  
19 in the Support Agreement, ... *the Holder of such Class 9 Existing Stockholder*  
20 *Interest shall receive the Existing Stockholder Shares and the Warrants.*

21 *Id.* (emphasis in original). Given this provision, the Court found, because it had to, that the  
22 “existing shareholder received ‘property,’ that it did so ‘under the plan,’ and that it did so ‘on  
23 account of’ its prior, junior interest. *Id.* at 96-97. The Court did not, however, go further:

24 We need not decide whether the Code would allow the existing shareholder and  
25 Senior Noteholders to agree to transfer shares outside of the plan, for, on the present  
26 record, the existing shareholder clearly receives these shares and warrants “under  
27 the plan.”

28 *Id.* at 95.

Simply, the absolute priority rule prevents an equity holder from retaining its equity  
interests if creditors are not otherwise being paid. It does not prevent a reorganized debtor from

1 voluntarily entering into an agreement with prior management. Here, Dr. Piazza is not receiving  
2 shares or warrants in the reorganized debtor, he is not receiving anything under the plan, and he is  
3 not receiving anything on account of his equity interests in Debtor. He is entering into a separate  
4 consulting agreement and non-compete which is at the insistence of Nevada PF and provides a  
5 valuable benefit to Nevada PF. This does not violate the absolute priority rule.

6 **B. The Releases of the Piazzas Are Not Impermissible Third-Party Releases Under the**  
7 **Plan.**

8 The Objections contend that the Piazzas are receiving broad third-party releases under the  
9 Plan that fail to comply with Ninth Circuit Law. *See* Meacher Objection, p. 2, ll. 13-15; pp. 10-  
10 12; *see* Committee Objection, p. 16, l. 13 – p. 17, l. 12. They are not.

11 As quoted in the Meacher Objection, the plan provides for, as plans typically do, that the  
12 Confirmation Order will enjoin future prosecution on claims that are “released, discharged, or  
13 terminated pursuant to the Plan.” *See* Plan, Section V.B. The claims against the Piazzas are not  
14 being released, discharged, or terminated pursuant to the plan. The claims against the Piazzas are  
15 being purchased by Nevada PF as part of its acquisition of equity in the Debtor. The reorganized  
16 debtor, here through Nevada PF, can do whatever it chooses with the assets that it acquires and in  
17 this case, Nevada PF has chosen to dismiss the claims (which are lacking in merit in any event)  
18 and for good reason. As stated by Nevada PF in its reply to these same objections raised in  
19 connection with the Disclosure Statement:

20 With due respect to the Committee, what FS DIP and Nevada PF aim to achieve in  
21 acquiring the Chapter V causes of action and other litigation claims belonging to  
22 Debtor is the peace of mind and freedom that comes from knowing that litigation  
23 or claims are not going to appear out of nowhere as they try to put their newly  
24 purchased reorganized business on sound financial and operational footing for the  
25 long haul. Not to be glib, but FS DIP and Nevada PF aim and desire to run a  
reorganized business here, not litigate or be drawn into litigation over the legacy of  
the past. What FS DIP and Nevada PF are buying are certainty and peace of mind  
for themselves and for the “2A” community with which they intend to do a robust  
business going forward.

26 Briefly, if more lawsuits appear out of the woodwork, the fear is that the  
27 reorganized business’s new customers will think something to the effect of, “Here  
28 we go again,” given all of the litigation that plagued Debtor’s legacy business here.  
At bottom, there is a prehistory to Debtor’s business that is steeped in and, in some

1 ways, tainted by, ongoing, protracted, and (oftentimes) demoralizing litigation that  
2 FS DIP and Nevada PF aim to cut off at the root. This has nothing to do with  
3 obtaining releases of any of Debtor’s insiders or anyone else; rather, it has to do  
4 with doing everything FS DIP and Nevada PF can do make a clean and sharp break  
5 with Debtor’s troubled litigation past (however meritorious or (more likely)  
6 meritless that litigation may otherwise have been). And that is why the purchase of  
7 these litigation claims is an integrated part of the deal – to accomplish a legitimate  
8 and understandable business objective

9 *See* ECF No. 338, p. 4, l. 21 – p. 5, l. 2.

10 **C. The Best Interest Test Is Not Violated Because the Unsecured Creditors Will Receive**  
11 **More than they Would in a Liquidation Because the Purported Claims that the**  
12 **Committee Contends Would Form the Basis For Recovery Do Not Have Value.**

13 The Committee spends the majority of the Committee Objection making unsupported and  
14 misleading allegations to try to lead this Court, and the creditor base, to a conclusion that the  
15 unsecured creditors have an alternative path to recovery by tanking a continued business in which  
16 many members surely wish to participate and instead opting only to pursue years of future  
17 litigation. *See* Committee Objection, p. 12, l. 23. – p. 15, l. 15. They do not.

18 **1. The Committee Objection Ignores the Value Unsecured Creditors Are**  
19 **Receiving Under the Plan.**

20 The Committee Objection first seems to largely ignore that the unsecured creditors are  
21 receiving \$3,000,000 under the plan and the added benefit to members from the Debtor’s business  
22 and property being reorganized into a world class “2A” experience. This is substantial value  
23 provided to the unsecured creditors that would not otherwise be available absent the plan.

24 Instead, the Committee diminishes this value by comparing the benefit to, what the  
25 Committee knows, is an inflated claim pool of \$74 billion (not a typo) of filed claims to suggest  
26 that the creditors are not receiving much on account of their claims. This is incredibly misleading.  
27 As the Committee is aware, many of the filed claims seek recovery well in excess of any amounts  
28 actually provided by the creditor to the Debtor. As a result, there are currently pending (and largely  
unopposed) objections to a significant amount of the claims. *See* ECF Nos. 411, 426, 442, 480.  
Based on this alone, the claim pool is reduced to close to \$15 million. Moreover, Debtor  
anticipates more omnibus claim objections to further reduce the claim pool to reflect the actual

1 value received by the Debtor. As such, and as supported by the liquidation analysis prepared by  
2 Debtor's financial advisors using this information, the unsecured creditor pool is likely no more  
3 than \$15,000,000, and instead, closer to \$11,000,000, which provides for creditors to receive  
4 between 20-30% of their claims, in addition to the benefit of the continued range operations  
5 through the reorganized debtor.

6 **2. The Purported Claims Against the Piazzas are Not Legitimate Claims That**  
7 **Would Provide Meaningful Recovery to the Estate.**

8 The Committee Objection next contends that unsecured creditors, currently slated to  
9 received \$3,000,000 under the Plan and the benefit of a continued reorganized debtor, would fare  
10 better under a liquidation than they would in a sale. It does so by contending that Debtor has viable  
11 claims against Dr. Piazza for distributions made to Dr. Piazza over the past ten years. This is  
12 incorrect. Among other things, the Committee cannot extend the statutory look-back period of  
13 four-years, the period in which Dr. Piazza indisputably infused more than \$2,000,000 than was  
14 distributed to continue to fund operations, and even if it could, the Committee has fallen woefully  
15 short of presenting any evidence that viable claims exist.

16 a. Dr. Piazza Has Infused Over \$2,000,000 More than Was Disbursed to Him in the  
17 Last Four Years.

18 As stated in the Debtor's Statement of Financial Affairs, the support for which Dr. Piazza  
19 understands was provided to the Committee immediately upon the retention of its counsel and  
20 financial advisors, in the four years prior to the Petition Date, Dr. Piazza continued to fund  
21 Debtor's losses in his attempts to maintain the business as a going concern. These efforts came to  
22 an end when Dr. Piazza, losing the support of members, was unable to continue to single handedly  
23 fund the ever crushing litigation with LVDF and was forced to file this Chapter 11 Case. That Dr.  
24 Piazza has a net loss of over \$2,000,000 as a result of the amounts he funded to the Debtor prior  
25 to the Petition Date is information that is known to the Committee, but ignored in the Committee  
26 Objection.

27 b. The Committee Cannot Extend the Look-Back Period More than Four Years.

28 Knowing full well the any avoidance actions pursued under state statutes of limitations

1 would fail, the Committee argues that, because the IRS filed a claim, the Committee is entitled to  
2 a 10-year look back period. *See* Committee Objection, p. 14, ll. 3-9. However, there is no binding  
3 Ninth Circuit precedent that recognizes this result. Indeed, even the Committee has failed to cite  
4 a single case that would be controlling on this Court. *See* Committee Objection, fn. 49.

5 Furthermore, the IRS Claim in this case appears to be asserted as a penalty based on a  
6 failure to file certain forms, which Dr. Piazza believes is being remedied and will result in  
7 resolution of the claim. Even if it does stand, as it appears to be a penalty, and not for any actual  
8 tax imposed, assessed, or unpaid, it is not the type of claim for which the IRS would even have a  
9 ten-year look back period even under the non-binding caselaw that the Committee does cite.  
10 Specifically, the premise for using the IRS as a creditor that permits a trustee to expand the relevant  
11 look-back period to 10 years is found in 26 U.S.C. § 6502. *See* Committee Objection, p. 14, ll. 3-  
12 5. That section of the Internal Revenue Code, titled “collection after assessment,” provides for  
13 collection of any *tax imposed* within 10 years after the assessment of the tax. Here, the IRS Claim  
14 is not based on any tax imposed. There is no support, much less any cited by the Committee, that  
15 this type of asserted IRS claim is subject to the same 10-year recovery period.

16 Finally, even if this Court were to recognize an argument that a 10-year look back period  
17 could apply, such look back period is not without limitations. Indeed, there are several limitations  
18 that the Committee has not considered including: (1) the requirement that the IRS be both a  
19 creditor at the time of the transfer and have an allowable claim for the same tax liability in the  
20 bankruptcy case (in this case, it is not); (2) that the IRS must have assessed the tax liability before  
21 it may take action under IRC § 6502 (in this case, it has not); (3) that the trustee must first exhaust  
22 all remedies against the transferor before seeking recovery from the transferee (in this case, it has  
23 not); and (4) that allowing the trustee to utilize the IRS as a golden or triggering creditor leads to  
24 an absurd result by making the bankruptcy and state statutes of limitations meaningless (in this  
25 case, it does).

26 Thus, while the Committee argues in a single general paragraph that the look-back period  
27 has been extended to 10-years solely because the IRS has filed a proof of claim, it has not. The  
28 Committee does not have a likelihood, much less a certainty, that it could ever seek to recover any



1 amounts beyond four years which is fatal to its analysis that the unsecured creditors could  
2 somehow recover more in a liquidation than through the current proposed plan.

3 c. Even if the Committee Could Extend the Look-Back Period to 10-Years, the  
4 Committee Cannot Establish that any Colorable Claims Against the Piazzas Exist.

5 The Committee's argument that the unsecured creditors could recover more in a liquidation  
6 than through the Plan is based largely on its contention that that Debtor generated \$41.2 million of  
7 net taxable income from 2012 through 2020, which the Committee contends was distributed  
8 entirely to Dr. Piazza and his trusts. See Objection, p. 14, l. 10 - p. 15, l. 2. However, the  
9 Committee's one-sided analysis is not only wrong and misleading, but it also fails to even try to  
10 articulate how the Committee could even allege any of the other elements in order to establish  
11 even a *prima facie* fraudulent transfer claim. Put another way, the Committee has not, and cannot,  
12 even allege a *prima facie* case for fraudulent transfers.

13 First, the fact that Debtor has generated income, on which the Piazzas paid significant taxes  
14 is, in and of itself, significant evidence of the fact that Debtor was not insolvent, the first step in  
15 an fraudulent transfer analysis. It is unclear to Dr. Piazza how the Committee could even allege  
16 that amounts used to pay taxes on income generated could ever form the basis for a fraudulent  
17 transfer claim.

18 Second, the Committee does not, anywhere it is objection, allege that it could satisfy other  
19 elements of a fraudulent transfer case. There is not even a discussion of the elements necessary to  
20 meet its initial burden for a constructive or actual fraudulent transfer case.

21 Third, and as further set forth above, the Committee Objection completely ignores the other  
22 side of the equation, which is all the money that the Piazzas have infused into the Debtor, a net  
23 \$2,000,000 in excess of distributions in the past four years.

24 Simply, given the amount infused by Dr. Piazza in excess of the amount disbursed during  
25 the statutory look back period, Debtor's solvency, Debtor's profitability, and the large amount of  
26 income tax paid related thereto, there are no viable avoidance claims that could be initiated by the  
27 Committee, much less ones that, after payment of fees and costs to pursue, would provide the  
28 unsecured creditors with a greater recovery than they are currently receiving under the plan.

1 d. The 2005 Class Action Is Irrelevant to Confirmation and Not Evidence of any  
2 Viable Claims Against Dr. Piazza.

3 That the Committee Objection is no more than an attempt to gain leverage in these  
4 proceedings without having actual arguments to raise is perhaps most evident by the Committee's  
5 reliance on a settled matter as purported proof of the validity of claims against Dr. Piazza. The  
6 Committee Objection spends no less than three pages, and over forty-five pages of exhibits,  
7 discussing these allegations as if they were somehow proven or admitted earlier. They were not.

8 As acknowledged by the Committee, the allegations set forth in the 2005 Class Action were  
9 disputed and, as conceded by the Class Claimants' counsel in its own pleadings to the court in that  
10 matter:

11 The Defendants have denied and continue to deny each and all claims and  
12 contentions alleged by the Lead Plaintiffs in the Litigation. The Defendants contend  
13 that they met, and continue to meet, their obligations to all Class Members and that  
14 any reduction in membership price offers were due to memberships being offered  
15 with less benefits, such as course certificates for first time students, pro shop  
discounts, etc. The Defendants have also denied and continue to deny, inter alia,  
16 the allegations that the Lead Plaintiffs or the Settlement Class have suffered damage  
17 or were harmed by the conduct alleged in the Class Action Complaint.

18 Nevertheless, and without admitting any wrongdoing or liability, the Defendants  
19 have concluded that protracted litigation, even if they were to prevail, would be  
expensive and continue to severely harm the company's ability to properly service  
its members. Thus Defendants have determined that it is desirable and beneficial  
for them to fully and finally end this Litigation and the ongoing harm it is causing  
to them by settling the case in the manner and upon the terms and conditions set  
forth in this Settlement Agreement

20 See Case No. 5:05-cv-04532-JW, ECF No. 120.

21 The fact that claims were made, which claims were contested by the Debtor and Dr. Piazza,  
22 *and continue to be contested*, but were ultimately settled for the purposes of preventing protracted  
23 and expensive litigation is wholly irrelevant to any analysis as to whether the Committee has valid  
24 claims in connection with this case.<sup>4</sup> All references to such claims as evidence of liability here

25  
26 \_\_\_\_\_  
27 <sup>4</sup> Moreover, Committee counsel is no doubt aware that, pursuant to Fed. R. Evid. 408:

28 evidence of the following is not admissible....either to prove to disprove the validity ...of a disputed  
claim...:

1 (i.e., more than half of the Committee Objection) should be stricken or, at a minimum, ignored by  
2 this Court.

3  
4 **III. CONCLUSION**

5 Based on the foregoing, the Piazzas respectfully request that the Court confirm the plan,  
6 and for such other relief as this Court deems just and necessary.

7 DATED this 11th day of November, 2022.

8 GARMAN TURNER GORDON LLP

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(1) furnishing, promising, or offering — or accepting, promising to accept, or offering to accept —  
a valuable consideration in compromising or attempting to compromise the claim  
Yet, that is exactly what the Committee tries to do here.